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Morgens: More QTIP Mischief
By Wendy C. Gerzog
After her husband’s death on January 27, 2000,1 Anne
Morgens became the income beneficiary of a qualified
terminable interest property (QTIP) trust, with the re-
mainder at her death to benefit her husband’s and her
two sons and the children of their deceased daughter.
Besides her income interest in the trust, Mrs. Morgens
had a limited power of appointment,2 which the court
referred to as her ‘‘principal invasion interest.’’ Although
Mrs. Morgens and the two sons were named as cotrustees
of the QTIP trust, she resigned as a cotrustee on January
29, 2000. She then disclaimed her right to the principal
invasion interest in the trust on September 22, 2000. Also
on that date, one of the sons, Edwin, disclaimed his
interest in the remainder and as a result, Mrs. Morgens
acquired Edwin’s disclaimed interest. On that same day,
she partially disclaimed her newly acquired interest
except for a special power to appoint any of her hus-
band’s issue and she appointed the interest to the other
son and the two children of the deceased daughter.3
That November, Mrs. Morgens and the remainder
beneficiaries of the QTIP trust signed an indemnification
agreement whereby, in consideration of any gifts of her
income interest in the trust, the remainder beneficiaries
would indemnify her and her estate for specified gift and
estate taxes. In December the cotrustees of the QTIP
trusts petitioned the superior court to sever the QTIP
trusts into two trusts, A and B, with Mrs. Morgens
retaining her income interests in both.4
Also in December 2000, Mrs. Morgens transferred her
income interests in Trust A proportionally to each re-
mainder beneficiary. In so doing, she made a gift to them
under section 2519. On her timely filed gift tax return, she
calculated her net gift to be $4,111,592 (the gift of
$6,398,901, minus $2,287,309, the gift tax liability paid by
the donees). In January 2001, she transferred her income
interests in Trust B proportionally to those remainder
beneficiaries. After audit of these transfers, the agreed-on
net gift value for Trust B was $13,937,756 (the gross
amount of $21,623,964, less the donees’ paid gift tax cost
of $7,686,208).5
Mrs. Morgens died on August 25, 2002.6 Her executor
did not include in her estate the amount of the gift tax
paid within three years of her death because he main-
tained that the gift tax was not paid by either her or her
husband. The government argued that section 2207A(b)
did not shift Mrs. Morgens’s gift tax liabilities to the QTIP
trustees and therefore, section 2035(b) applies. Her estate
contended in court, however, that the government’s
interpretation would undermine the policy behind sec-
tion 2207A and that because the QTIP trustees are ulti-
mately liable for the gift taxes, section 2035(b) is not
applicable.7
The court reviewed the applicable law, first explaining
that the purpose of section 2035(b) is to prevent inter vivos
transfers occurring within three years of decedent’s death
from evading the additional tax on transfers that are
essentially testamentary. That is, because taxable gifts
benefit from not having a transfer tax imposed on the
amount used to pay the gift tax (unlike the estate tax
which is a tax-inclusive tax, that is, the tax amount is
itself subject to a tax), gifts that are made near a dece-
dent’s death should be taxed as they would be under the
estate tax. Next, the court identified the novel issue in the
case: the interconnection between section 2035(b) and the
1Estate of Morgens, 133 T.C. No. 17, at 3 (2009), Doc 2009-
28066, 2009 TNT 244-19.
2Id. at 5.
3Id. at 6-7.
4The trusts did not contain a spendthrift provision relating to
Mrs. Morgens’s income interest as did the original trust. Also, in
terms of funding, Trust A contained ‘‘115,000 shares of Proctor &
Gamble common stock’’ and Trust B had all of the remaining
assets from the QTIP. ‘‘Pursuant to Mrs. Morgens’ exercise of the
special power of appointment over Edwin Morgens’ former
interest and the terms of the residual trust pertaining to the
remaining seven shares of the residual trust, the remainder
beneficiaries of residual trust A were James Morgens, Anne
Carpenter, and Matthew Bretz, and the remainder beneficiaries
of residual trust B were James Morgens, Anne Carpenter,
Matthew Bretz, and trusts for the benefit of Anne Carpenter and
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In Estate of Morgens, the Tax Court ruled in favor of
the government that section 2035(b) applied to gift
taxes paid by qualified terminable interest property
beneficiaries to gross up a widow’s estate by that
amount. The court held that section 2207A did not
shift the gift tax liability to those beneficiaries to
exempt the widow’s estate from the application of
section 2035(b).
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QTIP gift tax inclusion and liability provisions, sections
2519 and 2207A(b), the latter of which were enacted in
1981. The QTIP inclusion sections, section 2519 for gift
taxes and section 2044 for estate taxes, require inclusion
at the surviving spouse’s termination of her income
interest in return for marital deduction qualification and
tax deferral at the first spouse’s transfer. Without the
QTIP provisions, the first spouse’s transfer of a life estate
to his spouse with the remainder to a third party would
not have qualified for a marital deduction because the life
estate would constitute nondeductible terminable inter-
est.8 That is, when the wife dies, her interest would not
otherwise be an interest includable in her estate although
the trust property would pass outside the marital unit.
‘‘The purpose of the terminable interest rule is to deny
the marital deduction for transfers between spouses if the
transfer has been structured to avoid estate tax when the
surviving spouse dies.’’9
Because the surviving (or donee) spouse must be
taxed on the underlying property over which she has no
ownership rights, Congress enacted section 2207A to
allow the second spouse to recover from the beneficiaries
of the property the transfer taxes relating to her gift or
estate inclusion. If the second spouse does not recover
those taxes from the QTIP trust beneficiaries, she will be
deemed to have made a taxable gift to them in that
amount.10
The court described the artifice behind the QTIP
marital deduction: ‘‘Although Mrs. Morgens received no
economic interest in the QTIP besides income for life, the
QTIP regime employs a fiction that treats QTIP as passing
entirely from the first spouse to die to the surviving
spouse.’’11 The QTIP trust underlying property is not
taxed until the surviving spouse either transfers her life
estate during her lifetime or at her death. At that time,
sections 2044 and 2519 continue ‘‘the deemed transfer
premise of section 2056(b)(7)’’ and impute ownership to
the surviving spouse. Because of this fiction, the court
held that Mrs. Morgens was the deemed donor.12
While the court agreed with the estate that Congress
intended QTIP trusts to bear the tax of the deemed
transfer under section 2519, the court said that didn’t
mean Congress shifted the deemed donor’s gift tax
liability to them. The court explained that the private
allocation of the tax burden is different from the statutory
obligation for the gift tax, which under section 2501 is
plainly on the donor and, under section 6324(b), only
secondarily on the donee. Likewise, the court held that
section 2207A(b) did not shift that primary responsibility
for gift tax payment.13
Finally, the court stated that the legislative purpose of
section 2035(b) was ‘‘to eliminate the Code’s incentives
for deathbed transfers.’’14 A ‘‘net gift’’ describes a gift by
which the donee’s conditioned payment of the gift tax is
the recipient’s consideration. With a net gift, however, the
donor has always intended to make a gift of the net
amount. In the case of a net gift, in Estate of Sachs v.
Commissioner,15 the court held that the gift tax paid by the
recipients was includable in the donor’s estate when he
died within three years of the gift because the purpose of
section 2035 would otherwise be compromised. The
estate had argued that Mrs. Morgens had not made a net
gift, but the court disagreed and emphasized that a QTIP
transfer makes the surviving spouse the deemed owner
of the property. She had the primary responsibility for the
gift tax payment; section 2207A(b) merely gave her a
right of recovery.16 The court distinguished Brown v.
United States,17 another case the estate had cited, because
of the QTIP provision’s imputation of ownership and
dismissed the estate’s argument that Congress in 1981
not only created the QTIP provisions but also implicitly
amended section 2035(b).18
Estate of Mellinger v. Commissioner
In Morgens, the court cited Estate of Mellinger v. Com-
missioner19 several times, referring to the court’s com-
parative and contrasting treatment of the QTIP
provisions in the two cases.20 In Mellinger, the decedent’s
estate included stock that she owned outright in a
revocable trust and in a QTIP trust established by her
predeceased husband. The government argued that the
decedent was the owner for valuation as well as inclusion
purposes. Although the court held that the stock in the
QTIP trust was included in her estate under section 2044,
it held that the stock should not be aggregated with the
other stock she owned at her death for valuation pur-
poses. The court explained that section 2044 and its
legislative history are silent on the issue of aggregation:
‘‘This property is ‘treated as property passing from the’
surviving spouse, sec. 2044(c), and is taxed as part of the
surviving spouse’s estate at death, but QTIP property
does not actually pass to or from the surviving spouse.’’21
Moreover, ‘‘at no time did decedent possess, control, or
have any power of disposition over the FOH shares in the
QTIP trust.’’22 While section 2044 was enacted to ensure
that the QTIP trust property would be taxed at least once,
the court stated that section 2044 did not require ‘‘iden-
tical tax consequences as an outright transfer to the
8Id. at 14. (‘‘Section 2056(b)(7) allows a marital deduction for
QTIP even though the surviving spouse receives only an income








1588 T.C. 769 (1987).
16Morgens, supra note 1, at 27-29.
17329 F.3d 664 (9th Cir. 2003), Doc 2003-11103, 2003 TNT 85-8.
In Brown, the husband had given his wife funds to pay all of the
gift tax on a gift she had consented to split with him. Applying
the step transaction doctrine, the circuit court held that the gift
tax was attributable to the husband and his wife was only a
conduit. Id. at 29-30.
18Id. at 30-32.
19112 T.C. 26 (1999), Doc 1999-3887, 1999 TNT 17-6, acq. at
1999-2 C.B. xvi.
20Morgens, supra note 1, at 18, 19-20 n. 20, 31.
21Mellinger, supra note 19, at 35.
22Id. at 36.
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surviving spouse.’’23 Mellinger relied on Estate of Bonner v.
Commissioner,24 which in turn had cited to Estate of Bright
v. United States,25 a case in which the Fifth Circuit refused
to aggregate the decedent’s fractional interests in real
property in a QTIP trust with the same property he
owned outright based on the rationale that section 2044
did not require the merger and the decedent never
controlled the property in the QTIP trust.26
By contrast, in Estate of Fontana v. Commissioner,27 the
Tax Court held that, for valuation purposes, the shares
decedent owned outright had to be combined with the
stock held in trust over which he had a testamentary
general power of appointment. Unlike Mellinger, in
which the decedent’s husband controlled the property in
the QTIP trust, the court in Fontana held that a general
power of appointment trust indicates the ownership
equivalent necessary to have the shares aggregated with
shares the decedent owned outright since, with a general
power of appointment, the decedent (and not his spouse)
controlled the ultimate beneficiary of the property.
Section 2207A
Section 2207A28 was enacted in 1981 at the same time
as the QTIP provisions. After several unsuccessful at-
tempts29 to ensure that the surviving spouse did not
inadvertently waive the right of her estate to recover the
taxes attributable to the QTIP, Congress amended section
2207A in 1997,30 to alter the original language of section
2207A(a)(2)31 to require a bright-line approach that indi-
cates the surviving spouse’s pointed intention to waive
reimbursement from the QTIP trust beneficiaries.32 To be
clear that the surviving spouse indeed wanted to waive
her right of recovery as to the transfer of property in the
QTIP trust, the 1997 amendment to section 2207A re-
quires a specific reference to the applicable code section
— 2519 or 2044 —, QTIP or QTIP trust, to effectuate a
waiver of that reimbursement right.33
Analysis and Conclusion
The QTIP provisions are seriously flawed and Morgens
illustrates how the QTIP inevitably creates inequities. If it
sounds confusing that the widow’s estate has to pay
taxes on property she never owned or controlled, that’s
because of the illogic behind the QTIP ‘‘so-called marital’’
deduction statute itself. Without the QTIP election, the
property would have been a nondeductible terminable
interest and taxed in her husband’s estate and there
would be no need to make the widow a fictional property
owner. Here, it’s the widow’s status as surviving spouse
that allows her predeceased husband to defer transfer
taxes, and she is essentially a mere conduit to enable this
statutory artifice.
It is the fiction of the QTIP provisions that makes the
case so unsatisfying as well as at least somewhat incon-
sistent with Mellinger.34 When the marital deduction is
afforded to the first spouse to die even though his widow
may not have had any input on the decision to make a
QTIP election and needs only to receive an income
interest in the trust property, it will always seem funda-
mentally unfair for the widow to be treated as if she
owned the trust property itself. This arrangement can
scarcely be described as ‘‘marital’’ and the deferral ben-
efits inuring to third parties (that is, the family of the first
spouse to die) are unsupported by the supposed rationale
for the marital deduction.35
Morgens is correct. Under section 2035(b), the gift tax
paid on transfers within three years of a decedent’s death
must be included in the surviving spouse’s estate to
augment the widow’s estate tax liability. If she had
retained her income interest until her death, the estate
tax, a tax-inclusive tax, would have applied under section
2044. Of course, in that case, she would have had a
section 2207A right of recovery from the QTIP trust for
23Id. at 37.
2484 F.3d 196 (5th Cir. 1996), Doc 96-16744, 96 TNT 111-13.
25658 F.2d 999 (5th Cir. 1981).
26See Mellinger, supra note 19, at 36-37.
27118 T.C. 16 (2002), Doc 2002-7744, 2002 TNT 61-11. The court
in Morgens did not cite Fontana.
28P.L. 97-34, Title IV, section 403(d)(4)(A), 95 Stat. 304 (1981),
amended by P.L. 105-34, Title XIII, section 1302(a), 111 Stat. 1039
(1997).
29See, e.g., Tax Simplification and Technical Corrections Bill of
1993, H.R. 3419, 103d Cong., section 601 (1994); The Tax Simpli-
fication Act of 1993, H.R. 13, 103d Cong., section 701; the
Revenue Act of 1992, H.R. 11, 102d Cong., sections 4701 and
4703; Tax Simplification Act of 1991, H.R. 2777, 102d Cong.,
section 501. ‘‘Thus, a general provision specifying that all taxes
be paid by the estate is no longer sufficient to waive the
[surviving spouse’s] right of recovery.’’ Joint Committee on
Taxation, 103d Cong., Technical Explanation of the Tax Simpli-
fication Act of 1993, 206 (Comm. Print. 1993).
30P.L. 105-34, Title XIII, section 1302(a), 111 Stat. 1039 (1997).
In H.R. Rep. No. 105-148, 613-614 (1997), the description of
present law stated:
For estate and gift tax purposes, a marital deduction is
allowed for qualified terminable interest property (QTIP).
Such property generally is included in the surviving
spouse’s gross estate upon his or her death. The surviving
spouse’s estate is entitled to recover the portion of the
estate tax attributable to inclusion of QTIP from the
person receiving the property, unless the spouse directs
otherwise by will (sec. 2207A). For this purpose, a will
provision specifying that all taxes shall be paid by the
estate is sufficient to waive the right of recovery.
31Section 2207A (a)(2), as enacted in 1981, read: ‘‘Paragraph
(1) shall not apply if the decedent otherwise directs by will.’’
32Section 2207A (a)(2), as enacted in 1997, reads: ‘‘Paragraph
(1) shall not apply with respect to any property to the extent that
the decedent in his will (or a revocable trust) specifically
indicates an intent to waive any right of recovery under this
subchapter with respect to such property.’’
33H.R. Rep. No. 105-148, at 614.
34Regarding Mellinger, supra note 19, it is unclear why the
court in that case allowed any departure from the fiction that the
surviving spouse is the deemed owner of the QTIP trust
property.
35See Wendy C. Gerzog, ‘‘The Marital Deduction QTIP Pro-
visions: Illogical and Degrading to Women,’’ 5 UCLA Women’s
Law J. 301 (1995); Gerzog, ‘‘Clack Estate: Adding Insult to Injury,
or More Problems With the QTIP Tax Provisions,’’ 6 So. Cal. Rev.
Law and Women’s Studies 221 (1996); Gerzog, ‘‘The Illogical and
Sexist QTIP Provisions: I Just Can’t Say It Ain’t So,’’ 76 N. Car. L.
Rev. 1597 (1998); Gerzog, ‘‘Solutions to the Sexist QTIP Provi-
sions,’’ 35 (ABA) Real Prop., Prob., & Tr. J. 97 (2000).
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that amount. Unfortunately, however, she does not have
a corresponding right of recovery under section 2207A
for this estate tax increase, even though the tax relates to
the QTIP trust. It is unclear from the case whether the
indemnification agreement would apply to estate taxes
imposed by section 2035(b),36 but if not, there does not
appear to be a section 2207A recovery right from the
QTIP beneficiaries regarding those additional estate
taxes.
It appears that Congress did not anticipate the unfair
tax burden placed on the surviving spouse’s estate when
there is no voluntary indemnification agreement regard-
ing additional estate taxes caused by the proper applica-
tion of section 2035(b). That is, although the widow’s
estate must include the gift taxes paid in connection with
her QTIP transfers made within three years of her death,
she does not have a recovery right under section 2207A
for those additional estate taxes. The tax recovery statute
specifically references only the imposition of gift tax or
estate tax under sections 2519 and 2044. Thus, there
needs to be a legislative solution to address the extra
burden on the surviving spouse when the widow makes
gifts of her QTIP interest within three years of her death.
Congress should amend section 2207A to apply also to
the additional estate taxes caused by the inclusion of the
gift taxes paid under section 2035(b). (Or, even better,
Congress needs to repeal the QTIP provisions them-
selves!)36See Morgens, supra note 1, at 7.
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